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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the past century, there has been an increasing trend in American government toward 
opening government procedures to the general public. These “sunshine” measures have taken 
several forms, such as opening up markup sessions, recording committee votes, keeping records 
of campaign finance, disclosure of agency reports, decreased anonymous voting, and televised 
broadcasting of congressional proceedings, among others. The intention of these reforms was to 
improve government accountability and responsiveness, increase public education and 
involvement in government, and prevent corruption and undue influence by special interests. 
Conventional wisdom about open government, however, does not take into consideration many 
of the repercussions of opening up congressional proceedings to the glare of public scrutiny. 
American government was not designed with openness as the highest ideal, nor has our 
government changed in the past two hundred years to become better suited toward open 
proceedings. Reforms in the 1970’s opened the deliberative process and made members of 
Congress more vulnerable to constituent and interest group pressure. These effects have had 
many negative impacts, in both the House Appropriations Committee and the Ways and Means 
Committees, for deliberative democracy and responsible budgeting.   
 This paper does not argue that sunshine measures are altogether bad for American 
government and should be abolished entirely. Instead, it highlights the flaws in open government 
reforms, showing how these reforms did not fulfill all of their intended goals, how they have had 
unforeseen detrimental effects, and how they have changed the Appropriations and Ways and 
Means committees from closed forums for deliberating about the national interest to institutions 
at the forefront of political strife and group pressure. These negative effects of open government 
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reforms suggest that Congress could better serve the national interest if it closed some of its 
proceedings, as the Ways and Means Committee did in 1983.  
Since the power of the purse is Congress’s fundamental power, the paper focuses on the 
two committees primarily responsible for raising revenues – Ways and Means – and for spending 
public funds -- Appropriations. These committees have the most power and importance, and 
therefore are often the center of political pressure from groups outside and within government. I 
describe the founders’ original intent in regards to open government, then how the political 
climate in the 1960’s led to reforms that changed our political structure and made Congress more 
open to the general public. The paper then examines changes in the Appropriations and Ways 
and Means committees before and after the 1970’s open government reforms. These shifts 
include the changing attitudes and motivations of members for joining these committees, and the 
changing influence of agencies, constituents and interest groups. Finally, the paper shows how 
these open government reforms have negatively impacted the ability of the members of these 
committees to deliberate, to legislate in the national interest, and to make responsible budgeting 
decisions . 
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE FRAMERS’ INTENT REGARDING OPEN GOVERNMENT 
 
 To determine whether open government fits within the American government’s design, 
one must establish whether it was one of the principles which the founders held to be of high 
importance when writing the constitution. The framers’ opinions and actions during the 
constitutional convention show their views toward public access to government deliberation. The 
decision to keep the constitutional convention private, the general views of the time about public 
consensus in government, the clause within the constitution that discusses publicity of 
congressional proceedings, and other decisions about government secrecy are all examples of the 
framers’ beliefs about open government. These four examples show that the founders did not 
view public access to government proceedings as essential to a republican government. 
The American government began in complete secrecy. For over three months, the 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention deliberated over the new government without any 
press coverage and without any word to the public about the proceedings. James Madison said 
that “no Constitution would ever have been adopted by the convention if the debates had been 
public.”1 There were several reasons to keep the proceedings private. The framers thought that 
the controversial subject matter might make people object to the constitution in general, they 
thought opponents might use excerpts from the dialogue to prevent the adoption of the 
constitution, and they wanted all of the delegates to be free to voice their opinions without 
concern for political repercussions. 
Many of the framers thought the subject matter at the convention to be too controversial 
and divisive in nature to allow the public to witness. “When Washington arrived in Philadelphia, 
he perceived a radical, divisive atmosphere that reflected the country's mood at a time when 
                                                          
1
 Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), 167. 
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dissolution of the Union seemed likely.”2  There were disputes between large states and small 
states, between federalists and anti-federalists, Tories, Whigs and Republicans. The delegates 
feared that if the public heard any part of the proceedings out of context, it would lead to an 
uproar and they would reject the constitution altogether.  
 The delegates also feared that if the proceedings were not secret, opponents of the 
convention would use some of the content against them. Even on the final day, after the 
convention had finished, the delegates voted to keep the proceedings secret indefinitely, on the 
grounds that if they were to make them public, “a bad use would be made of them by those who 
would wish to prevent the adoption of the Constitution.”3 There were many who opposed the 
adoption of the Constitution, so there was a legitimate fear that those opponents would either 
skew the information they received or take one controversial discussion and publish it to shed a 
bad light on the whole convention.  
Another rationale for secrecy was that the delegates wanted to be free to take strong 
positions, make uninhibited arguments and to compromise without appearing to stray from their 
constituencies demands.4 The delegates knew that they might have to make strong arguments 
that some parts of the country would object to, or conversely, they might have to compromise for 
the sake of reaching consensus. In the latter case, their constituencies might condemn them for 
not adhering to their preferences, or they might reject the constitution outright. Thus, from the 
very beginning of this nation’s existence, it has been understood that some deliberation must be 
private so as to allow free discourse among the participants. Allowing the public to intrude on 
the decision-making might have had a negative impact on the deliberative process, and therefore 
                                                          
2
 William K. Stevens, “Behind the Scenes in 1787: Secrecy in the Heat,” New York Times, 25 May 1987. 
3
 Edward J. Larson and Michael P. Winship, The Constitutional Convention: A Narrative History From the Notes of James 
Madison (New York: Modern Library, 2005), 159.  
4
Christopher Collier and James L. Collier, Decision in Philadelphia: The Constitutional Convention of 1787 (New York: Random 
House, 1986), 83. 
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the founders believed the proceedings should remain confidential. While this case applies to the 
constitutional convention and not congressional proceedings, the framers’ rationale for keeping it 
private shows that they believed that an open deliberative process can be detrimental to good 
government.  
The decision to keep the Constitutional Convention private may stem from general 
beliefs about democracy and public involvement at the time. Even republican government was a 
radical notion at the end of the 18th century. Furthermore, at the end of the eighteenth century, 
most people equated democracy with anarchy. They defined democracy in the classic Greek 
sense as the entire populace gathering to vote directly. The American intellectuals during 
revolutionary times strove to distinguish republicanism from democracy, so that the American 
people would be more agreeable to the idea.5 Thus, the notion of having direct access to 
deliberation in government was not on the forefront of the framers’ priorities. Not only did they 
believe that some government deliberation should be kept completely private, but they also 
believed in a representative form of government over direct rule by the people.  
The Constitution that the framers ratified barely contained any mention of public access 
to congressional deliberation. The only section of the Constitution that mentions congressional 
proceedings’ openness to the public is Article 1, section 5. It states,  
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the 
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and 
Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of 
those Present, be entered on the Journal.6 
                                                          
5
 George W. Carey, Popular Consent and Popular Control: 1776-1789. In Founding Principles of American Government: Two 
Hundred Years of Democracy on Trial. Eds. George J. Graham and Scarlett G. Graham, Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House 
Publishers, Inc. , 1977 
6
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The Constitution does not require any publication of actual deliberation and proceedings; it 
merely requires that the actual votes be recorded. The journal records vote totals, but it need not 
contain individual votes. Though recording of individual votes happens at the request of only 
one-fifth of members, there is still no recording of the debates’ contents. Since there was no 
mention of allowing the public to know the actual arguments presented, the framers did not give 
high regard to public inclusion in congressional deliberation. The delegates almost omitted this 
clause altogether, twice rejecting the motion to add it to the constitution before finally including 
it, as some deemed it to be objectionable and unnecessary.7 Some thought that it was 
unnecessary to demand that congress to publish the journal, as the public would call for its 
publication if its distribution was not significant. However, the delegates voted to include this 
section because to omit this requirement might make people suspicious and give opponents of 
the constitution a reason to criticize it.8  
 There were other matters that the founders believed should be kept closed to the public. 
For example, John Jay argues in Federalist 64, which is about the President and Senate power to 
establish treaties, that in some cases it is necessary for the President to keep information secret 
from the public. He gives two reasons for this. The first is that the public does not benefit from 
or need to know all of the information regarding treaties. The second is that there are cases in 
which it is in the national interest for some information to remain private, in order to encourage 
whoever gives the information.9 Though this essay refers to foreign affairs, the former rationale 
for allowing secrecy could also apply to general matters in the legislature. There are many 
situations, in the legislature, in which the public need not be informed of- and does not benefit 
from knowing about- the contents of the debates.  
                                                          
7
 Saul K Padover, To Secure These Blessings (New York: Washington Square Press, 1970), 263. 
8
 Padover. To Secure These Blessings, 263. 
9
 John Jay, “Federalist #64,” in The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 377.  
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 There is a great deal of similarity between the reasoning behind the founders’ decisions 
and writings condemning government openness and all of the problems with open government 
today. The concern that the people might take one part of a deliberation out of context and it 
would lead to disapproval of the entire piece of legislation, that opponents might also use some 
part of a speech out of context and use it against the legislative effort, that members might not 
speak freely out of fear of alienating their constituents -- these are all concerns that kept the 
founding fathers from publicizing the constitutional conventions. Yet these problems remained 
even when Congress enacted the open government laws of the 1970s, and continue to affect the 
current Congress. The framers also did not believe that keeping the public informed about the 
content of congressional deliberations was necessary. As evident from Article 1, they believed 
that to simply publish the individual votes on a piece of legislation was sufficient. ` 
 The fact that the Senate operated in secrecy during Congress’ early years is also evidence 
that American government was designed to allow separation between the public and their 
representatives. Though the House met in public sessions from the beginning, the Senate 
conducted all of its proceedings in private until 1794.10 If the original government thought it was 
sufficient to have only one branch of Congress open to the public, one can infer that prevailing 
attitudes of that time did not hold closed proceedings to be contrary to representative democracy.  
 American national government was not designed with openness as a primary objective. 
The Constitution itself does not require that the public have access to the actual deliberations of 
the members of Congress. The founders foresaw problems in opening up the deliberative 
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 Mildred Amer. 2008. “Secret Sessions of Congress: A Brief Historical Overview.” Congressional Research Service, 
Government and Finance Division. CRS Report for Congress (October) 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS20145.pdf 
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process. These problems continued onto the next two centuries, and are evident in the negative 
consequences of the 1970’s Government in the Sunshine laws.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS OF THE 1970’s 
 
 Throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s, many considered Congress to be disconnected from 
the public, unresponsive to the public interest, slow to achieve policy gains, and generally 
inaccessible. In addition, people criticized Congress for being more responsive to lobbyists and 
special interests than to their own constituents. These criticisms, compounded by several 
scandals in the 1960’s and early 70s, led to Congress’s enactment of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act in 1970, which opened up Congressional procedures to the public.  
 Many of Congress’s critics perceived a disconnect between members of Congress and the 
general public. This phenomenon, however, is only partially the responsibility of the 
congressmen. It also has to do with people’s general outlook toward politics and technological 
barriers to access to politics. Very few people at the time were aware of politics, or even who 
their representative was. Thus, they tended to view Congress as a distant, closed-off institution. 
Moreover, for the most part, in the 1950’s and 1960’s, citizens did not have strong views about 
particular aspects of policy. With the exception of important, controversial issues, people were 
generally uninformed about issues and tended to vote based on party identification.11 However, 
in the late sixties and early seventies, crises such as the energy crisis, the Watergate scandal, and 
controversial issues like school prayer and abortion made the public more attuned to 
congressional affairs.12 
 The major legislative issues of the time made people more critical toward Congress, 
accusing Congress of being slow and unresponsive. Congressional activity, by nature, is slow-
                                                          
11
 Leroy Rieselbach, Congressional Reform: The Changing Modern Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Press, 1994), 36. 
12
 Joseph Unekis & Leroy Rieselbach, Congressional Committee Politics: Continuity and Change (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1984), 107. 
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moving. The fact that Congress is decentralized, that a bill must go through multiple stages, and 
that it has many members with different opinions and different interests that must all come to a 
consensus means that any legislation happens slowly and gradually.13 Congress in the 1950’s and 
early 1960’s was especially decentralized, and it was particularly difficult to build enough of a 
coalition to move legislation through the various stages. Parties were relatively weak and 
committees had more control, so it was more difficult to reach a unifying consensus.14 The only 
major exception came in the mid-1960’s when the Democrats were in control of both Houses and 
the Presidency, and were thus able to enact the Great Society legislation. Political scientist Leroy 
Rieselbach writes, “Solid legislative majorities make the weakness of party discipline tolerable 
and provide the dominant party with incentives to advance major legislative program.”15 When 
government control was divided, however, Congress had much more difficulty enacting 
legislation. An example of Congress’ slow reaction to policy demands was the program that 
Lyndon Johnson proposed to reduce crime. By the time the bill had passed through both houses, 
it had turned into a pork barrel project, spread out to serve widely varying constituencies and was 
largely ineffective.16 Thus, during most of the 1960’s, the public was dissatisfied with Congress’ 
apparent disconnect with the public and its inability to enact policy.  
Members of Congress and their relation to lobbyists was another source of discontent and 
suspicion among the public. Congress in the 1960s was generally more responsive to interest 
groups and their own constituencies than to their party or to the national interest.17 This tendency 
was largely due to the fact that lobbyists had more direct communication with legislators than 
                                                          
13
 Walter Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 
Press, 2007), 17. 
14
 Samuel Kernell & Steven Smith, Principles and Practice of American Politics: Classic and Contemporary Readings 
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010), 251. 
15
 Rieselbach, Congressional Reform: The Changing Modern Congress, 29. 
16
 Rieselbach, Congressional Reform: The Changing Modern Congress, 34. 
17
 Leroy Rieselbach, Congressional Reform in the Seventies (New Jersey: General Learning Press, 1977), 47.  
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any average citizen, they were able to develop personal relationships with individual members, 
and they had the resources to devote more of their time to legislative issues. The public 
perceived this influence to be corrupt, even though the majority of relations between lobbyists 
and congressmen were legitimate meetings to discuss a certain group’s perspective on an issue. 
The lobbyist would serve as a liaison between a particular interest group and a legislator working 
in this area. The lobbyist often provided research and information about a subject that a 
congressman or his staff would not have the time or resources to acquire.18  
In the skeptics’ view, there were two problems with the lobbyist-congressman 
relationship. The public did not have access to much of congressional proceedings, since House 
committee hearings could not be televised, and the public did not have access to individual 
committee votes. As the majority of citizens had limited access to information about 
congressional proceedings, many citizens perceived lobbying activity to be corrupt and argued 
that pressure group influence was the decisive factor in legislative policy outcomes. Another 
criticism was that interest group access to Congress was unequal, and that only the interests that 
were organized and had enough money could influence congressional decisions. Therefore, 
congressmen received one-sided information.19 The perception of corruption in deals with 
interest groups would contribute to people’s desire for more open, accountable government.   
Though all of these factors describe the general dissatisfaction with Congress, the 
scandals in both the executive and legislative branches were possibly the most influential events 
in the 1960’s in evoking reform.20 There were six indictments against members of Congress in 
the 1950’s. Then, in 1963 Thomas Johnson (D-Md.) and Frank Boykin (D-Ala.) were indicted 
                                                          
18
 Lester Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963), 308. 
19
 Rieselbach, Congressional Reform: The Changing Modern Congress, 34. 
20
 Unekis & Rieselbach, Congressional Committee Politics: Continuity and Change, 108. 
12 
 
for conflict of interest and conspiracy to defraud the government.21 There were multiple scandals 
involving Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., a Democratic representative from New York.  He was 
indicted in 1958 for tax evasion, and in 1966, he lost his committee chairmanship because of his 
misuse of public funds for trips abroad and for putting his wife on the payroll.22 There were two 
other indictments in the 1960’s and two in 1970 alone. The Watergate scandal also had a 
dramatic effect on public faith in government. Even though that scandal mostly involved the 
executive branch, it contributed to general disillusionment with government among the public.  
The increasing perception of Congress as a cloistered, unresponsive body subject to 
lobbyist influence, combined with the series of government scandals, encouraged Congress to 
enact the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. The act made several reforms to the 
organizational structure of Congress to make it more responsive and more accountable. The 
reforms made meetings and floor sessions more open to the general public, affected the way 
votes were recorded, and allowed for more broadcasting of congressional proceedings. 
 The Act opened up the House committee sessions to photographing, broadcasting and 
televising. In 1973, the House adopted rules that required that all committee hearings, markup 
sessions and floor debates be open to the public, unless a majority of the panel voted to close 
them. The votes to close sessions were also recorded, keeping the pressure on those who wished 
to close the meetings. In 1975, the Senate adopted similar rules about committee hearings. Also 
in 1975, both the House and Senate agreed to open conference committee meetings. By 1975, 
95% of committee meetings were in public.23 
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 John L. Moore, ed. Congressional Ethics: History, Facts, and Controversy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Inc, 1992), 71. 
22
 Charles Hamilton, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.: The Political Biography of an American Dilemma(New York: 
Atheneum Macmillan Publishing Company, 1991), 447.  
23
 Leroy Rieselbach, Congressional Reform in the Seventies, 48. 
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 The Legislative Reorganization Act also made members’ votes more public. Individual 
legislators’ committee votes were now recorded, whereas before only the total votes were 
recorded, or none were recorded at all. In addition, teller votes were also listed at the request of 
at least twenty House members. Previously, voice, standing, and unrecorded teller votes allowed 
members to vote anonymously. Anonymous voting also became more difficult with the advent of 
electronic voting in 1973.24 These provisions aimed to make lawmakers more accountable by 
making it more difficult for members to take a position contrary to their constituents’ views or 
make contradictory votes in the committee meetings and in floor sessions.  
Congress, in enacting these “sunshine” laws in the 1970’s, intended to improve their 
public image. They sought to reduce the hostility that had amounted due to perceived undue 
influence by lobbyists, and lack of accountability, responsiveness, and ethics. These laws made 
lasting changes that had some of the intended effects, but also exacerbated some of the problems 
that the laws intended to rectify. These reforms had a major effect on the Congress’s overall 
ability to deliberate and produce legislation in the national interest.  
 
  
                                                          
24
 Kenneth Shepsle, “The Changing Textbook Congress,” in Can the Government Govern?, eds. John Chubb & Paul 
Peterson (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989), 253.  
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CHAPTER 3 
GOALS AND MOTIVATIONS FOR APPROPRIATIONS AND WAYS AND MEANS 
COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
 
 The 1970’s open government laws changed the nature of the House Appropriations 
Committee and the Ways and Means Committee. Committee members’ shifting attitudes and 
motivations for serving on these committees reflect the way the two committees have changed 
over time. The Legislative Reorganization Act’s changes to committee structure and its 
provisions about open government affected the power of the House Ways and Means and 
Appropriations committees. The shift in power changed the committee members’ allegiance and 
rationales for joining these committees, which shifted the committee members’ primary 
influences. Before 1970, most of the members’ goals for joining these two committees were 
power and prestige, creating responsible fiscal policy, and benefitting their constituents. While 
these goals still remained after the reforms, the degree of influence of each of these goals and the 
relationships between all of these goals changed.  
 The primary reason that House members joined the House Appropriations and Ways and 
Means committees, before the 1970’s reforms, was the power and prestige associated with 
membership on those committees. Both committees, in charge of the taxing and spending 
policies in Congress, make up the “purse string” component of congressional activity. Since the 
power of the purse is Congress’s principal function, members of these two committees see 
themselves as part of the vital power of Congress. Their work affects all other legislation and 
other members’ work. Congressional scholar Richard Fenno interviewed members of the 
Appropriations and Ways and Means committees about their motivations for joining their 
15 
 
particular committee. A new member of the Appropriations committee said, when asked about 
his committee membership, “If you are one of those whose consent must be obtained, then you 
are a more important person in the House. When you are on the Appropriations Committee you 
are that kind of person. That’s all. It’s a question of power.”25 Members felt a sense of pride and 
importance at being a member of the most sought after, fundamental committees of Congress. 
 The feeling of power and prestige did not disappear after the 1970’s reforms. Rather, the 
manner in which members directed their power changed. First, the power of the Ways and 
Means Committee changed as a result of the Legislative Reorganization Act’s addition of 
subcommittees, which introduced more powerful subcommittee leadership positions. The Act 
created other positions for members seeking power, thus reducing the hierarchy and Ways and 
Means Committee’s dominance. Second, opening markup sessions, televising House committee 
hearings and floor sessions, and recording individual committee votes, shifted the norms and 
allegiance of committee members, so that members viewed their power differently and shifted 
their power to fulfilling different goals.  
 Before the reforms, members’ pride in their Appropriations and Ways and Means 
committee membership manifested itself in their allegiance to the committee. Members’ primary 
goal was power, but power was not simply as an end unto itself in their attraction to the 
Appropriations and Ways and Means committees. Congressional scholar John Manley argues 
that members’ attraction to those two committees made them more likely to respond to the 
demands of the group.26 The prestige that attracted them was mostly within Congress, and made 
them more dedicated to service on this committee. Moreover, members on the Appropriations 
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 Richard Fenno, Jr. Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), 3. 
26
 John Manley. The Politics of Finance: The House Committee on Ways and Means (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1970), 53. 
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and Ways and Means committees usually did not serve on any other committees.27 Their pride in 
committee membership made them conform to the rules and norms of the group, and also kept 
their allegiance to the committee over other influential groups. 
Committee members felt primary allegiance to their fellow committee members, as 
opposed to their party or other members of the house. Committee members enhance their 
prestige through legislative successes on the House floor. The Appropriations Committee’s 
“floor success depends on its ability to present a united front in its confrontations with “the 
House.”28 Members knew they had more power if they were united and loyal to each other rather 
than to other interests within the House. The Ways and Means Committee was somewhat more 
influenced by the House, in the sense that committee members knew what would and would not 
be popular among other members and would legislate accordingly.29 Committee members’ desire 
to maintain power and prestige resulted in primary allegiance to the committee.  
This dedication to the committee also meant diminished adherence to party influence. 
“We try to write the best legislation we can in a non-partisan way,” said one Republican member 
of the Ways and Means Committee.30 A restrained sense of partisanship prevailed throughout 
both committees. This tendency has to do in part with the fact that committees were generally 
stronger than party leadership at that time, but also because members knew that they would have 
more influence and power on the Appropriations and Ways and Means committees if they were 
unified. There were also strong norms, among all committees, of reciprocity, of compromise in 
order to achieve policy goals, and of deference to committee expertise.31 Members generally 
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 Allen Schick. The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2007),  219. 
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 Richard Fenno, Jr. The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1966), 460. 
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 Manley. The Politics of Finance, 212. 
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looked out for one another and deferred to committee members in their specialties. These norms, 
during the period shortly before the 1970’s reforms, were stronger than party influence.  
Legislators’ sense of prestige and conformity to their committee also resulted in a greater 
tendency to put national goals ahead of mere constituency goals. Members of the Appropriations 
and Ways and Means committees in the pre-reform era still spent a great deal of time and 
consideration on doing favorable things for their districts. Indeed, one of the other common 
reasons for joining the Appropriations Committee was that members could bring projects to their 
districts.32 However, both committees’ private voting and closed markup sessions allowed 
members to pursue projects in the national interests that may have conflicted with the goals of 
interest groups in their districts. They could, and often did, advocate for one policy during 
committee markup sessions and take a different stance on the floor.33 Members still had an 
interest in serving their constituencies, but the fact that members were closed off from the public 
during markup sessions meant that they would be safe from political repercussions if they chose 
to take a controversial stance.  
 This overall trend toward putting committee loyalty over other influences gave freedom 
to members who wished to legislate in favor of the national interest, rather than specific 
geographic interests. A secondary goal to power and prestige -- “protecting the nation against ill-
advised expenditures” -- was also an important ideal for Appropriations members. While that 
was not necessarily their primary rationale for joining the committee, it was still the primary 
function of the committee as a whole. Allen Schick also refers to the pre-reform Appropriations 
Committee as “the guardian of the treasury,” harkening back to when the committee was 
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consisted of fiscal conservatives from safe districts who wished to rein in spending.34 The 
Appropriation Committee’s belief in its role as guardians of the treasury strengthened committee 
members’ solidarity. Ways and Means Committee members also enjoyed more freedom in the 
pre-reform years to enact unpopular but responsible legislation. Though it was not particularly 
common for members seeking a position on the committee to have the primary goal of 
promoting public policy, the members’ sense of pride and allegiance to the committee caused 
them to value good economic policy as well as policies that benefited their constituents.35  
 The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, along with the other open government 
reforms in 1973 and 1974, led to a shift in the goals and motivations of the members of the 
Appropriations and Ways and Means committees. While members still valued power and 
prestige, the degree and nature of their goals have shifted. Opening up the committee markup 
sessions intensified reelection pressure and, in combination with other factors, increased 
partisanship and decreased committee unity. These resulted in an overall shift of members’ 
allegiance from a combination of committee and constituency loyalty, to constituency, party, and 
interest groups. Members continue to claim a desire for power as their goal in joining the 
Appropriations and Ways and Means Committees, but the object of the power shifted from 
internal power to power to provide services to constituents.  
 Both committees still hold a great deal of power within Congress, but the 1970’s reforms 
changed the nature of their power in Congress. Before the reforms, the power manifested itself 
both in influence over other members of Congress and ability to benefit constituents. In the case 
of the Ways and Means Committee, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 resulted in less 
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 Allen Schick. The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 
218. 
35
 Randall Strahan. New Ways and Means: Reform and Change in a Congressional Committee (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 55.  
19 
 
power within the House because of its transferring of power to subcommittees. After the reform, 
members could find powerful positions as subcommittee leaders, and therefore the Ways and 
Means committee was no longer exceptional in its power and status as a “prestige committee”.36 
This diminished power diminished committee members’ sense of pride and allegiance to the 
Ways and Means Committee. If power and prestige incentivized members to legislate in the 
national interest, then diminishing this power and prestige would change the members’ 
incentives and make them less likely to take a responsible national policy stance if such a 
position would jeopardize their political standing with constituents. 
According to the theory that congressmen are motivated primarily by reelection, this 
diminished power and opening of the committees resulted in increased attention to 
constituencies’ demands and decreased attention to broader legislative responsibilities.37 
Decreasing the institutional power while increasing the access of the public and interest groups 
shifted members’ incentives. These changes made it more beneficial for members to legislate in 
their constituents’ interest and left less incentive to “be concerned about overall fiscal or 
macroeconomic effects of distributing benefits in this way.”38 Not only did reducing institutional 
prestige reduce members’ motivation to legislate in the national interest, but increasing public 
access to committee deliberation added to members’ electoral pressure.  Members were no 
longer free to take stances contrary to their constituencies and interest groups’ demands without 
political repercussions. Thus, if their constituencies’ interest conflicted with the national interest, 
Appropriations and Ways and Means committee members were more likely to legislate in favor 
of the former.  
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While maintaining a balanced budget and good economic policy were some of the 
primary goals of Appropriations and Ways and Means committee members in the pre-reform era, 
those goals became more difficult to fulfill politically. Motivation for committee membership in 
the more recent years has been to bring home as much benefit for constituents as possible.39 
While there still may be committee members who value fiscal conservatism, it became 
increasingly difficult to make arguments in favor of decreased spending or increased taxes, 
particularly when these decisions would impact committee members’ constituencies.  Thus, 
insofar as members of Congress value reelection and favoring their constituencies, members that 
place fiscal responsibility high on their priority list are often at a disadvantage. With an open 
deliberative process, there is less of an electoral incentive for advocating fixing budget deficits.40 
Instead, it is better politically to be seen allocating funds to districts and local projects, which 
appeases constituents and interest groups.  
Thus, members’ sense of power shifted from influence within Congress to power to 
benefit those outside of Congress. Members whose goals were to protect against unnecessary 
spending and tax cuts were at a disadvantage. Overall, committee loyalty diminished and loyalty 
to interest groups, constituents, and parties took its place.  The 1970’s open government laws 
were not the sole causes in these shifts in Appropriations and Ways and Means members’ 
attitudes and motivations. There were also changes as a result of the committee restructuring and 
the reduced power of the Ways and Means committee that followed. Parties also gained more 
power relative to committees as a result of the organizational shifts of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act. However, the open government laws exacerbated the changes that the 
organizational shifts caused, by increasing the political pressure from constituents. With more 
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access to the deliberative process, constituents and interest groups have more influence on the 
Appropriations and Ways and Means committees, often at the expense of deliberation and 
policymaking in the national interest.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUENCIES, AGENCIES, AND INTEREST GROUPS ON 
THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS AND WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEES 
 The goal of enacting open government laws was, in part, to make government more 
responsive to the public and less responsive to interest groups. The American public perceived a 
disconnect between Congress and the people and also a suspicious relationship between 
Congressmen and lobbyists. In some ways, these laws achieved their intended effect in that they 
did make members more politically vulnerable to their constituents.   However, they also had the 
effect of increasing lobbyist influence and slowing the legislative process. These laws also 
impacted the relative influence of executive agencies on both committees and on the 
Appropriations Committee in particular.  
 Before the 1970’s open government laws, agencies and House members had more of the 
direct influence in the legislative process, compared to constituencies and interest groups. When 
the majority of Congressional deliberations were open for the public and interest groups to 
directly observe the legislative process, the influence shifted and these two gained more direct 
influence compared to the agencies and other House members and committees. This increased 
influence of interest groups and constituencies has had negative consequences for Congress’s 
ability to deliberate, compromise, and legislate in the national interest.   
 Constituencies have always had a great deal of influence on their representatives in 
Congress, long before the legislative reforms in the 1970’s. There are several theories as to the 
extent of and reasons for congressmen’s commitment to their constituencies. Some take David 
Mayhew’s stance, which is that members’ primary drive is reelection, and therefore they center 
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their legislative activities on appeasing constituents.41 Another view is that citizens tend to elect 
representatives with similar views and preferences, and therefore congressmen’s actions tend to 
reflect their constituents’ desires.42 Though both may be legitimate, the latter does not account 
for as many of the congressional decisions as the former. A member may have similar qualities 
and beliefs as the majority of its constituencies, but when making decisions, he must consider 
political consequences for making any decision that alienates constituents. This weighing of 
political consequences is most pronounced when a certain piece of legislation in the national 
interest conflicts with constituencies’ desires. The 1970’s legislation that made congressional 
deliberation more open exacerbated constituency influence by making members more vulnerable 
to constituency criticism, and conversely, allowing for more opportunities to garner favor from 
their constituents through posturing. 
 In the pre-reform Congress, members were concerned about reelection but there was not 
as much opportunity for constituents to hold them responsible for decisions that they did not 
favor. With closed markup sessions and anonymous voting, the people could not hold the 
legislature accountable, so Congress was relatively free from citizen control. Legislatures were 
free to take one position during meetings and markup sessions and change their position on the 
House floor.43 There were fewer negative consequences from constituents because constituents 
had less access to the content of the discussions, or even the votes themselves. Thus, if a member 
of the Appropriations Committee decided to cut wasteful spending on a useless project in their 
district, he could do so and avoid major political repercussions from their constituents. Similarly, 
if a member of the Ways and Means Committee voted to raise taxes in order to balance the 
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budget, he could argue in favor of doing so in a private, closed setting. Members were relatively 
“insulated from political tides.”44 
 Opening up the committee debates and recording committee votes opened members up to 
more public scrutiny, thus introducing a need for political caution that they did not have prior to 
these reforms. With recorded individual committee votes and broadcasted floor sessions, 
constituents can hold Appropriations and Ways and Means Committee members directly 
responsible for any spending cut or tax increase in their district, even if the vote was a 
responsible choice for the nation as a whole. Since opponents have access to recordings from 
hearings and markup sessions, and use members’ comments out of context to show them in a 
negative light. With open government reforms, responsible voting or deliberation can lead to 
negative political consequences, discouraging members from acting in the national interest.  
The open government reform movement was a positive development for members 
seeking reelection, but had negative consequences for Congress as a whole. After the reforms, 
congressmen in the House Appropriations and Ways and Means committees could use their 
committee membership as an opportunity to be seen doing favors for their constituents. With 
recorded votes and televised proceedings, Appropriations and Ways and Means committees 
began to serve more as public venues for showing constituents how much power one has as a 
member to do services for them. The members that were primarily concerned with reelection and 
pleasing their constituents now had more incentive to join the committee after all votes and 
debates were recorded.  
In the post-reform Congress, increased access by the public influenced voting decisions 
and the content of congressional deliberation.  As committee deliberations were increasingly 
recorded and broadcast to the public beginning in the late 1970’s, and floor sessions were open 
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for broadcast in 1978,45  members began using these committee sessions and floor debates as 
forums for impassioned speeches appealing to constituents. Publicizing committee hearings, 
markup sessions, and floor debates “creates multiple audiences for every question, comment, or 
speech delivered in a committee room or on the floor.”46 Posturing and appealing to the gallery 
has replaced sound deliberation in many committee hearings. Indeed, one of the reasons the 
Senate was reluctant to allow televised broadcasting floor debates was because of the fear of this 
trend of “grandstanding,” which has become commonplace in the House.47 The fact that a 
member of Congress is under constant scrutiny means that committee members constantly have 
the opportunity to engage in activities that increase their popularity with their constituents, often 
at the expense of sound deliberation. While the Ways and Means Committee closed their markup 
sessions for this reason, this phenomenon continues in the Appropriations Committee. 
The open government reforms which publicized nearly all committee deliberations did 
have the intended effect of making Congressional proceedings more accessible to their 
constituents. Especially with the availability of CSPAN clips online, as well as government 
watchdog sites that track each member’s votes, members of Congress are constantly under public 
supervision. This phenomenon has led to negative consequences for members who desire to take 
a politically unpopular stance for the sake of the national interest, since the footage of their 
argument can be taken in a negative light. Conversely, there have been positive results for 
members who use the deliberative process to promote their own image for their constituents.  
Agency representatives have historically been the most directly influential groups on the 
House Appropriations and Ways and Means committees. Agencies exerted the majority of their 
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influence on the Appropriations Committee as opposed to other committees, since the 
committee’s decisions impacted them the most. Constituents were influential, but did not directly 
influence the policy proposals that went before the committees. Constituency interest was more 
of a consideration members made when considering existing legislation, but agencies were more 
influential in the primary stages of legislation.48  
Executive agencies had more freedom to influence Congress when congressional 
proceedings were less publicized and they had a more direct relationship with the committees. 
Collaborating with the House Appropriations Committee in particular, federal agency heads had 
direct influence over the policy proposals that the committees introduced, and they did so in 
relative privacy. The Appropriations committee would not consider any proposals until the 
president submitted his budget, and would then only invite agency officials to testify at 
hearings.49 Hearings were primarily devoted to communication with agency representatives. 
Agency officials saw hearings as their chance to share information about and gain support for 
their programs.50 Though there was some degree of competition, for the most part, committee 
members and agency representatives worked in concert. Members considered their requests 
before they considered the amount authorized. It was a cooperative environment, with agency 
members often referring to appropriations as “their committee.”51 The Appropriations committee 
members and agency representatives were free to work together without as much concern for the 
desires of authorizing committees, lobbyists or constituents. 
After the 1970’s open government reforms allowed for public hearings and markup 
sessions and the broadcasting of hearings and floor debates, executive agencies still held a great 
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deal of sway over Appropriations policy. However, what suffered was the closed, cooperative 
relationship between agency officials and members of the Appropriations Committee. The 
relationship between the two branches became more political and more competitive as their 
deliberations became exposed and pressure from interest groups and constituents intensified.52 
Though there was much continuity in the direct, influential relationship between the 
executive agencies and the House Appropriations Committee after the open government reforms, 
these laws brought more publicity and therefore enhanced the political pressure of their 
proceedings. The committee continued to consider the president’s budget before considering any 
other spending decisions. This increased political pressure coincided with an increase in 
competition between the two branches. Members of the Appropriations Committee now had to 
balance pressure from executive agencies with the political demands of constituents, other 
members, and interest groups. The executive agencies take advantage of positive publicity for 
their spending promises: “every astute member of Congress knows that the prepared testimony 
of the cabinet officer is reported by the press while the congressional questioner is largely 
ignored.”53 In light of the political pressure to acquiesce to agencies’ spending demands, the 
appropriations committee has difficulty considering responsible spending decisions. The 
increased publicity of broadcasted appropriations hearings has given executive agencies the 
political advantage and thus increased their influence on members of Congress, taking away 
from the closed, cooperative pre-reform environment.  
The House Ways and Means Committee had a similar relationship with executive 
agencies, but the two did not depend on one another quite as much as in the case of the 
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Appropriations Committee. There was also a great deal of compromise between the two 
branches. The executive set forth proposals, but in consideration of what the Committee’s 
reaction would be.54 While they may not have been in perfect agreement, the most important 
difference between the pre- and post-reform Ways and Means Committee is that it conducted its 
proceedings more directly and without as much outside pressure from constituents and interest 
groups. 
 Though the open government reforms’ purpose was, in part, to reduce the perception that 
members of Congress receive undue influence from interest groups, these reforms have proven to 
have the opposite effect. Interest groups, in their ability to attend every part of the deliberation 
process, now have more sway over congressional procedures than before. Before, members had 
some freedom in their ability to isolate themselves from interest groups and oppose them, if it 
was in the nation’s interest for them to do so. Opening up the committee hearings and markup 
sessions in the Appropriations and Ways and Means committees increased lobbyist access and 
influence.  
 Interest groups were present and influential in Congressional proceedings before reforms, 
but their access was different and limited. The pre-reform lobbyists were influential in Congress 
but did not control policy.55 They served as coalition partners, keeping members informed about 
a group’s opinions on an issue, providing them with information, and connecting members to 
other groups in a given policy area.56 In many cases, lobbyists did not influence members 
directly, but rather they exerted their influence on executive agencies, which in turn, would 
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collaborate with Congress.57 Perhaps the most important difference between the pre-reform 
Congress and the post-reform Congress was that members were free to take one stance in a 
committee session that reflected their better judgment about national interest but did not coincide 
with the interest group’s goals, and the lobbyist or interest group would not be aware.58 Thus, all 
of the benefits of lobbyist involvement may have been served -- providing of information, 
representation of a particular group, assistance with coalition building -- without undue influence 
over the deliberative process.  
 Opening up the legislative process increased interest group access to all aspects of 
congressional deliberation. After the 1970’s reforms, lobbyists could attend committee markup 
sessions, in addition to committee hearings, and track the votes of individual legislators at every 
step of the legislative process. According to political scientists Leroy Rieselbach and Joseph 
Unekis, “These developments meant, in sum, that congresspersons were more exposed to interest 
groups, executive branch personnel, and the public generally in their activity.”59 While the open 
government reforms were successful in their goal of opening government up to the public, their 
more pronounced effect was make the legislative process more vulnerable to interest groups. 
These groups, after all, are organized to track congressional activity and have the funds to keep 
representatives on the Hill, whereas the general public may not have the time, organization, or 
interest to pay such attention to the legislative process.60  
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 Allowing lobbyists to sit in on committee hearings and meetings gave them more power 
to influence legislation. Lobbyists make up the majority of attendees of a committee meeting.61 
“Capitol Hill lobbyists regularly fill committee hearings and markups, jam into conference 
committee rooms, and pack House and Senate galleries.”62 New technology allows lobbyists to 
send out information about proceedings from within the committee meetings. Technology 
“makes it easier to organize and send a political message across the country at warp speed.”63 
Opening congressional proceedings in the 1970’s was the beginning of a process by which 
interest groups had more access and resources to pursue their policy goals, while members of 
Congress had less anonymity and autonomy in their deliberative process.  
 Congress enacted the 1970 Legislative Reorganization act and other reforms in the 
1970’s to open up congressional deliberation as a reaction to the accusation that Congress was 
unresponsive, closed-off, and gave undue attention to interest group demands. These reforms 
were successful in opening up the deliberative process, but they did not fulfill all of the intended 
goals. They succeeded in opening Congress up to the public, but at the expense of sound 
deliberation and legislation in the national interest. The reforms also changed the nature of the 
agency-committee relationship, making it more political and competitive. Finally, these reforms 
led to increased access and influence by interest groups: the opposite of the reforms’ intent. All 
of these shifts in influence and increased pressure from constituents, agencies, and interest 
groups have led to an increase in irresponsible spending, diminished deliberation, and other 
negative unintended effects.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF OPEN GOVERNMENT REFORMS 
 Opening up government procedures has had several negative consequences for 
deliberative democracy and the budget process in general. Not only did these reforms fail in 
many of their intended goals, but they have had other, unforeseen consequences. Increased 
interest group and constituency influence, as well as a decline in the quality of deliberation, are 
problematic unto themselves. In addition, they have contributed to other negative trends in the 
budget process, such as increased earmark spending, recourse to omnibus legislation, and budget 
deficits. As a result of many of these problems, the Ways and Means committee went back to 
closed committee markup sessions in 1983, which indicates that open government does not 
necessarily lead to better government.  
 One of the most detrimental results of open government reforms is their negative impact 
on the deliberative process. Opening congressional proceedings, keeping recorded votes and 
broadcasting hearings and floor debates encourages the self-seeking, reelection-driven members 
to take advantage of the deliberative process for their own self-interest. Rational deliberation in 
the national interest suffered at the expense of posturing. The decline of the deliberative process 
has contributed to other ramifications of the open government reforms, through their creation of 
a politically charged atmosphere at the expense of an environment of rational debate and 
judgment in the national interest.  
 The problems that open government reforms cause become more apparent when one 
considers what the highest form of lawmaking should be. Congress ought to be a reasoned 
deliberative body working toward the national interest. If the highest level of congressional 
activity is improving the nation through sound public policy, then any legislative reform should 
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work towards that goal. The opposite would be for a member to make decisions based on his 
own self-interest and reelection.64 Considering that these are the basic principles and functions of 
Congress, any legislation that may improve accountability or responsiveness but at the expense 
of reasoned legislation in the national interest is undesirable.  
 Opening up the deliberative process enhances the effects of reelection incentives on 
candidates’ policymaking. Congressional scholar David Mayhew theorizes that all members of 
Congress are rational, self-interested actors primarily seeking reelection.65 While some argue that 
reelection is the primary goal, the more conventional view is that reelection is a major 
consideration but not the ultimate one.66 The reelection goal often conflicts with the need for 
unpopular and politically risky but important decisions in the national interest, such as reducing 
spending or raising taxes. To make such decisions, members must to be free to express their 
opinions, reason with one another, and make compromises. Opening up the deliberative process 
and broadcasting congressional debates reduces this possibility, and turns members toward the 
lower level of policymaking and away from legislation in the national interest.67 If members feel 
as though they are under constant scrutiny by constituencies, interest groups, and opponents, they 
feel more political pressure and focus their attention to reelection and posturing, rather than 
sound deliberation. 
 The increase in posturing is one of the manifestations of the open government laws’ 
diminishing of the deliberative process. Corresponding with televising and broadcasting 
committee meetings and floor sessions, there has been a rise in partisan, politically divisive 
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speeches, usually about a minute in length, which allow members to differentiate between their 
policies and those of the other party, and also to make individual attacks against other 
members.68 This outcome was one of the reasons many members objected to televised 
proceedings of floor debates. According to Representative David Worth Dennis, they feared 
fellow members, , “will be spending more time making hay on the television camera than in 
doing the business that we are sent there to transact.”69 In a deliberative process without 
publicity, the lawmaker who is most knowledgeable or has done the best work on a subject takes 
precedence over the member who is most adept at promoting his own image.70 “By 
oversimplifying and sensationalizing certain policy controversies, the media discourages rational 
decision making.” 71 Members view open proceedings as a chance to be seen doing positive work 
for their constituents, often at the expense of sound deliberation in the national interest. 
 While not all members of the public may have been attentive to their congressmen’s 
actions, the advent of televised proceedings and recorded committee and floor votes, combined 
with new technology, allows the more attentive groups to hold members more responsible by 
bringing their decisions to a wider audience. Before televised proceedings and recorded votes, 
there was a greater difference between attentive and inattentive publics’ knowledge of 
congressional action. Political Scientist Douglas Arnold describes attentive publics consisting of 
interest groups with a particular policy agenda that they followed, as well as constituents that felt 
strongly about one issue in particular. Since members could easily gauge these groups’ reactions 
to their policies, they did not have to proceed with quite as much caution as when considering the 
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inattentive publics’ reactions.72 Even if the latter do not pay close attention to congressional 
activity, they may still be aware of major legislative decisions. Members must question “whether 
[their] decision will be defensible if it were to appear on the front pages of major newspapers in 
[their] district.”73 The problem that arises is that members of the attentive public can 
communicate with the public at large about members’ decisions, but do so by taking these 
decisions out of context and putting them in a negative light. Interest groups and election 
opponents have, through the internet, access to all the members’ votes and video clips from 
congressional hearings, which they can use against a member of Congress who votes in the 
national interest at the expense of his constituency. Thus, having televised committee meetings 
and floor sessions and recorded votes increases the electoral pressure for members of Congress.  
 Though the open government laws were well intentioned, they had many flaws that 
negatively impacted deliberation. They achieved some of their goals but at the expense of sound 
policymaking; in some ways they did nothing to further certain goals; and in other cases, these 
laws produced the opposite of their intended effects. These laws were intended to make the 
public more aware of the content of congressional proceedings, improve the general public’s 
perception of Congress, and prevent lawmakers from making illicit deals with interest groups. In 
many ways, however, they have failed to do all three of these.  
 If the open government reforms have made the public more educated about Congress, it 
is only to show the more negative and less substantive aspects of congressional action. Indeed, 
one of the initial objections to the proposal to televise House and Senate floor sessions was that 
such an act would not really educate the public because “most coverage is confusing or 
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uninteresting.”74 As a result, most broadcasters cover stories about ethical violations and 
scandals, rather than substantive policy. Television does not expose the public to a balanced, 
non-partisan, comprehensive view of the policy under debate, but rather, the small fraction of the 
debate that is most entertaining and/or most controversial.75 
 Another purpose of opened proceedings was to improve public sentiment toward 
Congress in general. First, the very fact that the goal was to improve perceptions of Congress, 
rather than the actual effectiveness of Congress, indicates how these reforms were not intended 
to promote high-level policymaking. Second, that merely allowing the general public more 
access to congressional activity would improve Congress’ image as a closed institution ignores 
the fact that the media may exacerbate other criticisms of Congress. In addition to an overall 
decline in media coverage of policymaking, reporting tends to “cover the horse race in politics; 
focus on the human impact of government policies; treat bad news more often than good news; 
and talk to your targeted audience.” Since both televised and printed news tends to report 
scandals rather than policy achievements, most of the coverage of Congress reinforces the 
negative stereotypes of congressmen as being corrupt and detached from the public interest.76 
Perhaps the most important failed goal of the open government movement was to 
decrease the influence of lobbyists and special interests on members of Congress. Opening up 
markup sessions to the public necessarily opens these proceedings up to interest groups. “An 
open, decentralized institution, Congress affords lobbyists multiple opportunities to shape the 
fate of legislation.”77 Whereas before, members had autonomy and privacy when considering 
their spending decisions, after the reforms, lobbyists were free to attend and participate in all 
                                                          
74
 Donald Wolfensberger. Congress and the People: Deliberative Democracy on Trial (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000), 106. 
75
 Wolfensberger. Congress and the People, 124.  
76
 Davidson, Oleszek, & Lee. Congress and Its Members, 493.  
77
 Roger Davidson, Walter Oleszek and Frances Lee. Congress and Its Members, 390.  
36 
 
hearings and markup sessions. Even if lobbyists primarily provide information and data for 
members of Congress, rather than bribe and pressure them to legislate in their favor,78 members 
are still more directly accountable than they were before. Before the open government reforms, 
members could take a lobbyist’s information and still go into meetings as independent actors 
who could legislate in favor or against the lobbyist’s wishes. After the reforms, their decisions 
were no longer anonymous, and they go into meetings with the lobbyist’s facts and information 
with the added pressure that if they do not vote in the interest group’s favor, there could be 
political repercussions. Even with public deliberation, there is still the possibility of side deals 
and corrupt influence of lobbyists.79 Not only do these laws increase lobbyist influence, but they 
also fail to prevent members from meeting with lobbyists in secret.  
 There are three reasons why this increased interest group access is detrimental to good 
policymaking. First, interest groups can have a great deal of influence in a member’s re-election: 
either positively, through campaign finance and advocacy, or negatively, through negative 
advertisements. The second issue is that since only a certain subset of the nation’s interests has 
the resources and organization to have government advocacy, the spending pressure that 
congressmen are exposed to is uneven and unrepresentative of the general population’s interest. 
Finally, since the vast majority of lobbyist pressure is for spending increases and rarely for 
spending cuts, increased lobbyist access has led to increased pressure for fiscally irresponsible 
budgeting.  
While lobbyists have increased access to congressional proceedings, they have also 
become increasingly influential in congressional campaigns. Their increased involvement in 
campaigns did not result from open government laws, but this trend has made their direct 
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influence policymaking more problematic for sound deliberation. In the past, interest groups 
waited until after elections to influence those who had been elected. Now, through PACs and 
other methods, interest groups have increasingly been directly involving themselves in elections 
by providing campaign funding and positive advertising for friendly legislators, and negative 
advertising for legislators that work against their goals. According to congressional scholar 
Morris Fiorina, “between the mid-1970’s and mid-1980’s PACs increased more than sevenfold,” 
from approximately 608 in 1974 to over 4,140 in 1986.80 Between 1997 and 1999 alone, the 
number of registered lobbyists increased by 37%.81 With the increasing cost of campaigns, 
members rely more and more on interest groups to provide funding.82 Interest groups fund 
campaigns directly, and they often host fundraisers. This phenomenon raises the electoral 
incentive for members to conform to interest group pressures. Conversely, there are increasing 
negative consequences for going against interest group demands. Lobbyists can quickly and 
effectively report on the contents of hearings and markup sessions and broadcast members’ 
decisions to their constituents from within the meeting.83 Interest groups act as the attentive 
publics, tracking members’ votes and broadcasting clips from committee meetings. If a member 
makes a statement or votes against the interest group, he runs the risk of having that vote or that 
statement distributed to his constituents.84 Although the decision may be a responsible one, the 
affected interest group could take it out of context and show the lawmaker in a negative light.  
Even if one argues that lobbyist influence is not necessarily a problem because lobbyists 
represent legitimate constituent interests, the groups that lobby members of Congress do not 
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reflect all public interests. It takes a great deal of money to hire a lobbyist to establish 
relationships with members of Congress, conduct research and attend committee meetings. 
Therefore, the majority of interests represented on the Hill are wealthier, more educated 
groups.85 The top industries represented in Congress are insurance, pharmaceuticals, health 
products, telephone utilities and tobacco.86 Seventy-two percent of interest groups are 
businesses.87 Not only do interest groups need money, but they need to be organized enough to 
focus on specific policy agendas. Economist Mancur Olson theorized that for this reason, small 
groups with a very specific interest in policy will have the most success on the Hill.88 Thus, 
interest group influence brings an imbalanced set of pressures on members of Congress. Poor, 
less-educated groups do not have as much access to Congress and therefore their interests are not 
represented as much as those of businesses and other, wealthier groups. If Congress is to be a 
nationally representative body, the strong influence of one subset of the population is 
problematic.  
One of the major problems with increased lobbyist access to congressional proceedings is 
that lobbyists overwhelmingly impose pressure to increase spending, which adds to the difficulty 
of producing a balanced budget. Political scientist James Payne argues that Congress chronically 
overspends because of the tremendous pressure from lobbyists, which only encourages spending 
and hardly calls for fiscal responsibility. He argues that there is a direct correlation between the 
opening up of committee markups to the public and the growth of the deficit. “The more you 
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open up the process, the more people are paid to come here and increase spending.”89 The vast 
majority of interest groups come to Congress with spending requests. For every member of 
Congress, there are 38 lobbyists and approximately $2.7 million spent on lobbying.90 Payne also 
argues that “people are against spending in general, but not against it in particular.”91 Even if a 
member of Appropriations or Ways and Means has the goal of reducing the deficit, he will 
always have someone present during every step of the deliberative process who advocates for a 
spending increase or opposes a tax increase. Whereas before, members could propose spending 
cuts during markup sessions without being politically accountable, the Appropriations 
Committee now conducts all of its proceedings surrounded by groups with a vested interest in 
increased government spending. Moreover, there are no individual incentives for members to 
vote to reduce spending or raise taxes. Not only do these groups have a great interest in 
spending, but they also have power over members’ reelection prospects, giving them leverage in 
the decision-making process.  
 There are several manifestations within the budget process of the problems that open 
government reforms have caused. The past few decades have seen a trend of increased earmark 
spending, recourse to omnibus legislation, and increased deficit. While there are additional 
reasons for these phenomena, the fact that committee proceedings are all open to the public and 
all votes are recorded and open enhances the political necessity or attractiveness of these actions.  
There has been a steadily rising trend of recourse to omnibus legislation in the post-
reform Appropriations and Ways and Means committees. Many congressional scholars see 
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recourse to omnibus measures as a breakdown in the regular appropriations process.92 They give 
members the advantage of passing legislation what would have otherwise hurt them politically. 
Either the general public doesn’t know about specific unpopular provisions because the omnibus 
bill is so massive, or they have the excuse of having to pass something because it contained so 
many other necessary provisions. In the case of omnibus continuing resolutions, members do not 
have much of a choice but to vote in favor of them because to vote against them would be to 
close down the government.93 Omnibus measures present a problem, however, since their 
massive size prevents sound deliberation over every provision. It is often the case that hardly 
anyone in Congress knows about all of the contents, let alone has a solid grasp on the policy 
effects of every provision. With closed government and without recorded, published votes, 
members would not have to resort to omnibus measures to enact controversial but responsible 
legislation. Members were safer from public scrutiny so they did not have to resort to all-or-
nothing legislative decisions.  
The increase in earmark spending is another example of constituency and lobbyist 
influence affecting the regular appropriations process. There were as many as three times more 
earmarks in 2004 as ten years earlier. Congressional scholar Allen Schick describes three reasons 
for this increase. First, members are more individualistic and it is harder to convince them to 
support appropriations bills otherwise. Second, earmarks help members in reelection campaigns 
by channeling funds to interest groups and projects in their district. Third, lobbyists are 
becoming increasingly more organized to demand favors.94 This trend has to do, in part, with the 
fact that members are under closer scrutiny of lobbyists and constituents.  As we have seen, 
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lobbyists are physically present for all of the deliberative process, advocating their demands and 
putting pressure on members.95 Earmarks also give members of Congress an opportunity to show 
their constituents that they are serving the districts Though some see earmarks as a relatively 
harmless way of gaining bipartisan support for a bill, earmarks also detract from rational 
decisionmaking.96 Members should agree to a bill because it is sound policy that benefits the 
general interest, and not because they can curry favor with their constituents.  
Another argument against open government proceedings is that it encourages 
irresponsible, excessive spending. Budget deficits have been an increasing concern for Congress 
since the early 1980’s.97 Before the reform, the Appropriations and Ways and Means committees 
had certain norms of fiscal responsibility and autonomy. With deliberation and cooperation, they 
could produce a neutral budget without endangering themselves politically. Now, for virtually 
every spending decision, there is a lobbyist, an agency official, or a constituency group with a 
vested interest in Congress allocating the maximum amount of funding. James Payne argues that 
these individual pressures are responsible for Congress’ tendency toward irresponsible spending. 
The requests that these groups make are overwhelmingly for increased spending, with no one on 
the other side arguing against spending. The intensified access of lobbyists that resulted from 
open government reforms continues to influence spending decisions.  “The ethos of ‘open’ 
government requires that these lobbyists be given a hearing.” Members, overwhelmed by pro-
spending messages, are converted into spending advocates.98 
 A very telling measure of these negative consequences of open deliberation is the fact 
that the Ways and Means Committee, in 1983, voted to return to closed markup sessions. They 
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also developed a closed rule procedure for House floor debates on tax legislation and returned to 
the practice of recruiting members from safe districts. “The post-reform committee couldn’t 
manage the function of balancing interests of members and clientele groups with broader policy 
goals.”99 The committee closed its markup sessions because of the same causes that have 
diminished the Appropriations Committee’s ability to deliberate reasonably and legislate in the 
national interest: because “enhanced accountability to interest groups and constituents 
undermined deliberations about tax policy.”100 Members said that having representatives of 
clientele groups and constituency interests present during markup sessions made it difficult for 
them to vote for policies that introduced or raised costs for those groups that had supported them. 
Closing the deliberative process helps members consider broader issues that affect the nation as a 
whole, rather than focusing on posturing and serving local interests that are present at the 
meeting.101 All of this testimony from members of the Ways and Means Committee shows how 
the opening of the deliberative process negatively impacts legislation in the national interest, and 
that returning to closed rules helped foster cooperation and responsible lawmaking.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The impact of the open government reforms of the 1970s shows how increased 
transparency does not necessarily lead to better government. While the conventional belief is that 
increased transparency and accountability is always a positive quality in government, the impact 
that transparency has had on the House Appropriations and Ways and Means committees 
suggests otherwise. These reforms have negatively impacted Congress’s ability to deliberate and 
legislate in the national interest by changing the attitudes and motivations of the members of the 
House Appropriations and Ways and Means committees and also by changing the influences on 
their behavior. These reforms made lobbyists and constituents more dominant in congressional 
proceedings, which shifted members’ focus from guarding the treasury toward pleasing these 
groups and improving their chances of reelection.  
 Though people tend to revere transparency as essential for democratic government, 
excessive accountability does not fit within American representative government. Republican 
government, and not direct democracy, was the original structure designed by the founding 
fathers. In a republican government, elected members of Congress can refine public opinion, 
using rational argument and deliberation to make policy that enhances the public good. Opening 
up the deliberative process to external pressures hinders members’ freedom to express their 
opinions, reason with their colleagues, and compromise on public issues. 
Congress enacted these “sunshine” measures as a response to public criticism that 
Congress had become unresponsive, corrupt, and beholden to special interest groups. In some 
respects, these laws were successful. They did make members more accountable to their 
constituents and, to a certain extent, they raised public awareness of congressional action. 
However, these successes came at a cost to responsible legislation. Making members more 
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accountable to the public also makes them equally more accountable to special interest groups 
and their lobbyists. This combination of lobbyist and constituent pressure leads to increased 
posturing, decreased deliberation, and acquiescence to spending demands. Thus, transparency 
made members more accountable, but at the expense of sound deliberation and fiscal 
responsibility.  
The early stages of legislation that occur within the committees and subcommittees 
should be sheltered from outside influences. These parts of the process should consist of less 
politics and posturing in exchange for more reasoned discussion about the substance of the 
legislation. Legislators have been elected to represent their constituents and refine public interest 
in order to make sound national policy. Therefore, the legislative stages should be left up to 
lawmakers, and they should be protected from the glare of public scrutiny. The public should be 
aware of final debates and votes, but the formulation of legislation should be left to members of 
Congress.  
 For all of these reasons, the House Ways and Means Committee returned to closed 
markup sessions in 1983. The committee had experienced a decline in its ability to produce 
responsible national legislation, and went back to closed proceedings which would give them 
more freedom to make politically difficult decisions. Since many of these problems remain, both 
committees should close some of their processes in order to foster good public policy. 
First, the Appropriations Committee should return to closed markup sessions. Since the 
same negative consequences of open government reforms that affect the Ways and Means 
Committee also apply to the House Appropriations Committee, that committee should adopt 
similar rules to close their markup sessions. In addition, both committees should be able to 
exclude television cameras from committee hearings. Hearings can be open to the public, and 
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print journalists should be welcome to attend committee hearings, but members should be able to 
exclude television cameras.  Moreover, committee votes should be kept private at the request of 
a small percentage of members. The floor should remain almost entirely open to the public; all 
votes should continue to be recorded and all forms of recording and broadcasting should be 
permitted. The public should have access to information about the legislative process once the 
legislation has been formulated and is put to a vote to the committee as a whole. However, 
members should be able to exclude television cameras from floor debates for particularly 
divisive or controversial legislation that has a time constraint. This provision would prevent the 
delays caused by political speeches aimed at the public rather than for other legislators.  
Especially in the 111th Congress, greater protection from outside influence is necessary to 
reduce the growing deficit.  The American people cannot afford to have politics stall legislation 
that would raise revenues or decrease spending: two actions that are politically difficult but very 
necessary for fiscal responsibility.   
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